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FREE WILL AND MORAL EVIL 
by Keith Lovin 
The existence of evil is the most intractable problem confronting the ortho- 
dox theist in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The  theist must be able to show 
that the occurrence of evil in the world is somehow compatible wfth the 
existence of a God who is omnipotenl (i.e., one who can do anything which 
is not logically impossible), omniscient (i.e., one whose knowledge is absolute 
and without limitation), and omnibenevolent (i.e., one whose goodness is such 
as to eliminate y i l  wherever possible). In short, the theist must hold that there 
1s no unnecessary br gratuitous evil in the world. For if a world containing less 
evil were, possible then some evil is unjustified, and such a world would be 
incompatible with God's attributes. 
In this paper I shall consider theistic responses to the problem of moral evil. 
I shall begin by showing why the onus is on the theist to show that moral evil 
does not render theism indefensible. Next, I shall consider lines of defense 
offered by the theist. I find it necessary to distinguish between two sorts of 
theism, what I shall call perfect-world theism and imperfect-world theism. The 
only difference between these two types of theism is that perfect-world theism 
rests, for its successful defense, on its being the case that this is the best of all 
possible worlds. I take Leibniz to be a representative of this view, for he clearly 
claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds, Imperfect-world theism, for 
the purpose of this paper, does not requife that this be the best of all possible 
worlds, but only that this world be the best world that it was logically possible 
for God to create. I take as representatives of this view Professors Alvin 
Plantinga and Keith Yandell. Both versions of theism, however, depend upon 
its being the case that there is no unnecessary evil in the world. Both versions 
employ the free will argument to make their case. I shall argue that perfect- 
world theism is logically contradictory and that imperfect-world theism either 
is contradictory or  entails moral judgments which are incompatible with other 
of its essential tenets. 
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The free will argument holds that moral evil-evil and suffering which result 
from men's own choices and conduct-is justified on the ground that a world 
in which men have freedom to choose evil as well as good is a better world 
than one in which men lack such freedom. The theist assures US that he is not 
insensitive to human suffering. He  deplores the evil that men inflict upon other 
men by their choices and immoral conduct. But he insists that a world in whtch 
men have free wills is better than a world in which men do not have free wills, 
and being free means being able to choose evil as well as good.' 
One essential tenet of theism is now clear. God must be conceived as having 
moral obligations similar to those incumbent upon men. If this were not SO, 
evil would not present a problem and the theist would not have to justify its 
presence in the world. But this symmetry of obligations shared by God and 
men creates a certain difficulty for the theist. For  even if free will and always 
choosing the good are somehow impossible or  contradictory, it can reasonably 
be inquired whether free will is sufficiently valuable to justify all of the evil it 
produces. Obviously, a man who could have prevented another man from 
torturing someone, and yet did nothing, is morally blameworthy. He  could not 
justify his lack of action by claiming that to have intervened would have 
required restricting the exercise of the torturer's free will and that that would 
have been worse than allowing the torture. If it is possible to prevent needless 
cruelty by restraining the exercise of the torturer's free will, it is right to d o  
so. If a man would have a duty to intervene in this way, why would not God 
likewise be required to intervene? It is clearly the burden of the theist to prove 
that this exercise of the torturer's free will is worth the cost. 
The important point here, however, is that the theist is prevented by his own 
argument from saying that what is obligatory upon men cannot be shown to 
be obligatory upon Deity. H e  cannot take the position that an impasse has been 
reached and that the theist and atheist alike must fall back on intuitions which 
are irreconcilably different. For  if God does not have obligations similar to 
men's, it would not be necessary to justify evil, and the free will defense would 
be superfluous. In that case God could have created, without blameworthiness, 
a world with even more evil in it than this world. In the absence of obligations 
similar to men's, God would not have to create the best possible world. But 
it would then become quite impossible to specify what it means to say that God  
is morally perfect. In other words, if a genuineIy better world was possible, and 
~f God could have created it but did not, he cannot be conceived as perfectly 
good. 
Further, if God has only some obligations s im~lar  to  those men have, it 
appears purely arbitrary to say which he has. It is the introduction of the free 
will argument that shows that the theist does find it necessary to justify the 
ways of God toward men. For it is the possession of free will that is supposed 
to show why God has not done wrong in creating a bad world (a world with 
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some evil in it). So it is clear that the theist cannot, at this stage in the 
discussion, fall back on intuitions differing from those held by the atheist. 
Indeed, the successful defense of theism requires an argument to show that all 
instances of moral evil are necessary and justified. 
In this section I shall deal with perfect-world theism, which holds that the 
existent world is the best of all possible worlds. Although I take Leibniz as a 
representative of this view, my remarks are not directed exclusively to his 
theodicy but to possible variations of it as well. All references to the theist in 
this section are to be read as applying to the perfect-world theist. 
The theist says that this is the best of all possible  world^.^ He does not deny 
that there is evil in the world; he simply holds that a world containing evil can 
be shown to be better than a world not containing evil. And the reason a world 
containing moral evil is said to be better than a world not containing moral 
evil is that moral evil is the result of free will, the value of which outweighs 
any good that could be achieved in its absence. But there is a fatal flaw in 
this argument. The very freedom to which the theist appeals to defend his 
claim about the justification of moral evil can be shown to undermine his 
argument. 
Suppose that at some time in the past X tortured Y. The theist has to say 
that a world which includes the suffering of Y at X's hand is better than, or  
at least as good as, a world in which X did not torture Y. Initially, this sounds 
like an incredibly insensitive thing for the theist t o  say, and something which 
makes a shambles of our most certain moral judgments. But the theist would 
deny that he is guilty of this charge of moral blindness and insensitivity. H e  
would reply that of course it would have been better if X had freely chosen 
not to torture, but instead to help, Y. The theist deplores X's action; his claim 
is that a world in which X can freely choose, even if he chooses to torture Y, 
is better than a world in which he had no choice. In  the absence of choice we 
are told that the world would consist of automata programmed by God to do 
good, and that such a world would be less good than a world in which men 
are genuinely free. 
Now when the theist speaks of free will he means a capacity which men have 
for choosing, freely, between alternative courses of action. Thus, X can be said 
to have freely chosen to torture Y if it had been possible for him to have freely 
chosen not to torture Y. The  sense of freedom to  which the theist appeals here 
is the kind of freedom that the ethicist recognizes to be a necessary condition 
of ascribing either blame or praise to  an agent. This reflects the view that in 
morals the claim "I could not help it," if true, is always an excuse. A man who 
tortures another is responsible only if it was possible for him to have acted 
otherwise; that is, if it was possible for him to have freely chosen not to torture 
the other person. 
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Consider again the theist's claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. 
There are several interpretations of what the "best possible world" might 
mean. I wish to begin by distinguishing three such interpretations, the first two 
of which are included to show what the theist does not mean by "best possible 
world." It is important to include the first two interpretations not only to show 
the range of possible interpretations, but also to help guard against an illicit 
shifting from one interpretation to another. 
1. If it is meant that the best of all possible worlds must include the 
particular evil of X torturing Y, and that a world in which X did not torture 
Y would have been less good, then X could not have acted otherwise and the 
free will argument collapses. In other words, since the theist claims that only 
the best of all possible worlds can exist, and since the existent world includes 
specific instances of moral evil, no one could have acted otherwise since had 
he done so this would not be the best of all possible worlds. But if men could 
not have acted otherwise they did not act freely, and free will can no longer 
be used to justify moral evil. 
2. Another interpretation of the "best of all possible worlds" is that the best 
possible world includes X freely choosing to torture Y. If X had not freely 
chosen to torture Y this would not have been the best possible world. From 
this i t  follows that X should be commended (or at least not blamed) for 
torturing Y. On this interpretation Hitler ought to be commended (or at least 
not blamed), since he heightened and intensified good. But this is an interpreta- 
tion which the theist must reject as absurd, for it renders meaningless all moral 
judgments and admonitions, including those which are essential to theism, 
such as the Ten Commandments or the ethical principles expressed in the 
Sermon on the Mount. 
3. The theist deplores all instances of moral evil in the world. He means by 
saying that this is the best of all possible worlds, that a world in which men 
can freely choose evil as well as good is a better world than a world in which 
men can choose only He deplores the torturing of Y by X and says that 
a world in which X had freely chosen to help Y would have been better than 
a world in which X had freely chosen to torture Y. But a necessary condition 
of X freely choosing to torture Y is that X could have freely chosen not to 
torture Y. And if it was possible for X to have freely chosen not to torture Y, 
then a world in which X so chose is a possible world. Therefore, on his own 
terms, since it was possible for X to have freely chosen not to torture Y this 
cannot be the best of all possible worlds. 
But suppose that the theist were to respond as follows. Suppose he allows 
that if X had freely chosen not to torture Y then, in that respect, the other 
world would have been better. But he might claim that in that other world 
there would have been, in one way or another, just as much, or more, evil. So 
on the whole. that other worid would not have been better. 
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This is a dangerous argument for the theist to embrace, since it threatens 
the very character of the free will response, That is, he appeals to free will to 
justify (and hence explain) moral evil. But when it becomes apparent that free 
will cannot justify a particular instance of evil (X torturing Y) because it was 
possible for X to freely choose not to torture Y, the theist retreats to different 
ground. H e  now claims that had X chosen not to torture Y the world, in some 
way, would have been as bad or worse than it is with X's torturing Y. But for 
this to be a satisfactory response there must be some evidence, independent of 
X's torturing Y, that shows that a world without the torture would contain 
as much or more evil. 
To make this point clear consider the following example. Suppose that A 
and B are lost in the wilderness and have been seriously injured in some 
accident. Suppose that both are going to die and they know it, that both are 
suffering greatly, that A has an ample supply of medicine that will relieve their 
pain, and that A hates B and does not share with him the pain-relieving 
medicine. Now A's action of not sharing the medicine is, ex hypothesis, a free 
action (or omission); he could have done otherwise. Both men die, but A dies 
peacefully and B dies horribly. Now to  say that if A had shared with B, and 
both had died peacefully, that world would have contained as much or more 
evil than the one in which A did not share with B, may be true, although it 
is extremely difficult to imagine how. But while the theist's assertion that the 
other world would have contained as much or more evil, without providing 
independent evidence to support it, may, in language reminiscent of Hume, 
save the conclusion that God's moral perfection is compatible with moral evil, 
it certainly does not establish that conclusion. And it was precisely for the 
purpose of establishing that this is the best of all possible worlds that the free 
will argument was introduced. 
There is another equally serious difficulty with this kind of response by the 
theist. It has already been shown that the theist would have to have indepen- 
dent evidence of the good consequences of morally evil acts even to save his 
conclusion. But for the theist to take this position, and argue that there is such 
independent evidence, he would have to  demonstrate the evidence for each evil 
choice, a task which is clearly impossible. If, however, the theist attempts to 
offer a general argument to show that the consequences of each evil choice are 
always better than those that would have followed from good choices, there 
is no point in calling them evil choices. Indeed, if every instance of moral evil 
that has ever occurred, or will ever occur, is such that if the agent had freely 
chosen otherwise the world would be just as bad or worse, the distinction 
between good and evil choices vanishes. 
The upshot of all this is that the theist cannot adopt interpretation three, 
which has the consequence of denying that this is the best of all possible 
worlds, unless he can somehow show that every instance of choosing eviI 
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produces good. Any general argument which purports to show this obliterates 
the distinction between good and evil choices, and interpretation three then 
collapses into interpretation two. 
So, of the three possible interpretations of the theist's claim that this is the 
best of all possible worlds the first disallows his free will defense, for in that 
interpretation there is no freedom. The second interpretation is a reductio ad 
absurdurn, for it entails the meaninglessness of moral judgments fervently 
endorsed by the theist. Further, since the free will defense is a moral defense, 
the second interpretation is self-contradictory because it entails the impossibil- 
ity of meaningful moral judgments. The third interpretation perserves the 
sense of freedom necessary for the theist's claim and it allows for the possibility 
of genuine moral judgments, but it has the consequence of showing that this 
is not the best possible world. 
The very nature of the free will appealed to by the theist has been shown 
to contradict his claim that this is the best possible world. Hence the free wilI 
response to the problem of moral evil does not solve the problem. Rather, it 
presents the problem in a more acute form. Since granting free will entails that 
this is not the best of all possible worlds, the theist must either provide another 
justification of moral evil or admit that there is in the world unnecessary evil 
that cannot be reconciled with God's attributes. In the absence of another 
argument justifying moral evil, the only reasonable position is to reject the 
theist's claim that there exists a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and 
perfectly benevolent. 
The theist might try to defend himself against this argument along the 
following lines. His claim that being free entails being free to choose evil as 
well as good has not been attacked here. And since we are talking about the 
choices of men and not gods, he might argue that some evil must be chosen. 
Therefore, he might say, free will does justify moral evil. 
But this will not do. For even if we grant his claim about freedom entailing 
that evil sometimes be chosen, this only shows that some moral evil is justified 
on the basis of free will and not that this instance of evil is so justified. T o  show 
that this particular instance of moral evil is necessary and justified would 
require an additional argument, and that is precisely what the theist does not 
have. The problem is not just that the theist is unable, now, to provide another 
argument; the problem is that h ~ s  argument about free will precludes any other 
argument. For a logical consequence of his claim about free will is that this 
is tzot the best of all possible worlds, and yet the successful defense of his claims 
about God requires that this must be the best of all possible worlds. Therefore 
the theist's argument designed to justify moral evil is logically contradictory 
and must be rejected. 
T o  sum up, it has been argued that if there are no instances of moral evil 
such that the agent could have freely chosen otherwise, it then follows that 
there is no freedom. And if there is no freedom the free will response cannot 
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explain the occurrence of moral evil. But if there are instances in the world 
(even a singIe instance) where a man chooses evil but could have chosen 
otherwise, then a world in which he does choose otherwise (good) is a possible 
world. And by the theist's own admission to choose the good freely is better 
than to choose evil freely. Hence, this is not the best of all possible worlds. 
The dilemma confronting the theist is forced upon him by the requirements 
of theism itself. He must deplore moral evil. To deplore moral evil he must 
postulate freedom. The freedom required to act either in a morally blame- 
worthy or  a morally praiseworthy manner requires that men be able to choose 
between different possible worlds. To deny this is to deny freedom. To allow 
this is to admit that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Either is fatal 
to perfect-world theism. 
In this section my argument is directed against imperfect-world theism, the 
view that while this is not the best possible world, it is, nevertheless, the best 
world that it was logically possible for God to create. AH references to the 
theist in this section are to be read as applying to the imperfect-world theist. 
The theist might try to reconstruct his argument in the following way. He 
might deny the Leibnizian claim "that this universe must be in reality better 
than every other possible ~niverse ."~  He might admit that it has been shown 
that this is not the best of all possible worlds. But he might argue that so far 
from undermining orthodox theism, this only relieves the theist of having to 
claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. All that the theist need claim 
is that this is the best world that it was logically possible for God to create. 
That is, the theist might concede that a better world is possible (one in which 
X freely chose not to torture Y), but maintain that it was logically impossible 
for God to have created it since he would then have had to cause X to choose 
not to torture Y, in that case denying genuine freedom to X. It is no limitation 
on God's power or his goodness to say that he did not create a better world, 
although such a world is logically possible. 
Alvin Plantinga seems to adopt this position, for he writes: 
Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot causally or otherwise determine them to 
do only what IS rlght; for ~f he does so then they d o  not do what IS rlght freely.' 
Keith Yandell also seems to favor this position, for he argues that it is open 
to the theist to accept the following propositions: 
( I )  It IS a log~cally necessary condition of any world In w h ~ c h  there IS moral value that there 
be free agents In that world . . . 
(3) It IS log~cally ~mposs~ble that God, In a world where there are free agents, prevent that 
any evil choices are made (since then the agents would not be free).' 
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Yandell does acknowledge that these propositions are enornlously compli- 
cated. He  believes, however, that whatever the nature of the dispute about 
them, the worst that can result for the theist is an impasse and that no 
contradiction can be established. 
The theist's position is now seen to involve the claim that free will and the 
moral good which it makes possible are so valuable that even though a better 
world is logically possible, it is not a world which it was possible for God to 
create. But when this line of defense is analyzed, it turns out that the kind of 
freedom required to make the theist's argument tenable is an extreme form of 
metaphysical indeterminism. Professor Stephen T. Davis acknowledges this, 
for he says that it is clear that the free will defense "is based upon a definite 
libertarianism, i.e. upon a concept of genuine possibilities that implies real 
indetermini~m."~ Davis further says: 
If God creates [man] such that Iman] w~l l  always choose the good, [man] IS no longer free 
to choose the ev~l  He IS not free because he 1s somehow being Influenced by God, and as 
we have scen, to say that [man] is 'free' is prec~sely to rule out any external interference or 
~nfluence '
It is clear that the freedom which the theist posits rules out absolutely any 
form of "compatibilism" such that an act can be regarded as both free and 
caused. For if an act can be free and still be regarded as the effect of some cause 
-the agent's character and disposition, the moral advice of teachers or friends, 
the examples set by other morally exemplary persons whose lives have in- 
Ruenced the agent-then God could have, and should have, governed the 
causes in such a way as to bring about free choices of moral good. If the 
instruction and example of a parent can be a causally influencing factor in a 
child's free choices for good, then God could, without in any way denying 
freedom, have created a world in which men freely choose good most, if not 
all, of the time. 
Antony Flew has recently argued that compatibilism not only provides the 
correct way of understanding human conduct, including free conduct, but also 
that it is an essential tenet of theism itselfSg H e  cites impressive evidence from 
St. Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther to show that libertarian free will 
entails a premise from which we may deduce that God does not exist. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of the compatibil- 
ist thesis, other than to point out that if some form of compatibilism is true, 
the free will argument fails to justify moral evil. This is the case because the 
free will posited by the theist was thought to explain moral evil, since without 
the freedom to choose evil as well as good, the moral value of free agents would 
be denied. But if some form of compatibilism is true, the moral value so highIy 
regarded by the theist does not justify all the moral evil that free will produces. 
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In other words, if compatibilism is true, God could have governed causes in 
such a way as to allow for free choices which do not include choosing evil.1° 
To deny this is to deny God's omnipotence, to allow this is to say that there 
is some unjustified evil in the world. 
The theist is now faced with a different dilemma. Moral value is said to be 
possible only through the exercise of free will, which is not compatible with 
causes of any type, including character, dispositions, exhortations, examples, 
advice, instruction, and so forth. But it follows from this that the moral 
assessments of praise and blame that everyone (including the theist) makes are 
logically inappropriate. We very often praise people, parents for example, for 
providing the moral instruction and guidance which result in honorable and 
decent children. But if this moral training in any way functions as a cause in 
bringing about the good character of their children, then the parents are not 
praiseworthy; rather, they are blameworthy for having deprived their children 
of the possibility of freely choosing to become honorable and decent. 
Now it is the theist who insists that freedom, in his sense, is all-important. 
Without this freedom the moral value of choosing the good would be denied. 
But if this is true, the achievement of the all-important values of honesty and 
integrity has been denied the children, in the example above, since the parent's 
instruction functioned as a cause. It would have been better to have left them 
utterly alone so that they might freely choose to  be honest and trustworthy. 
On the other hand, if moral guidance and training do not function as a cause 
in the development of good character, what is the point of them? How should 
we then understand such Biblical admonitions as "Train up a child in the way 
he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it"?" 
It is only in the view that there is a causal connection between moral 
education and conduct that there is any point to such admonitions. But ~f there 
is such a connection, and if the choices for good which thereby result are free 
choices, it follows that an act can be both free and caused. If a parent has an 
obligation to govern causes in such a way as to increase the likelihood of 
morally good choices by his children, then God could do the same without 
depriving his creatures of their freedom. Parents often fail in this regard 
because of miscalculations or ignorance o r  simply an inability properly to 
construct the causal environment. But God, owing to his omniscience and 
omnipotence, would never similarly fail. 
That people do  in fact regard a person's choices and conduct as the effect 
of antecedent causes is exhibited not only in moral situations where we praise 
or blame accordingly, but also in our whole social and legal structure. It is 
because a person's choices and the resultant conduct are thought to be affected 
substantially by background, environment, guidance, and example, that chil- 
dren are sometimes taken away from parents and placed in foster homes o r  
made wards of the court. For similar reasons persons living in ghettos are 
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sometimes excused for conduct that would be harshly treated elsewhere. On 
the same grounds courts sometimes accept as mitigating or extenuating cir- 
cumstances a person's previous experiences or homelife. 
The position adopted by the theist, then, turns out to be either contradictory 
or a species of the second interpretation of "best possible world" given in 
section 11. It is contradictory if compatibilism is true. Free will and the moral 
value it makes possible were offered as the justification for moral evil. But if 
compatibilism is true, free will does not justify moral evil. For in that case God 
could have caused men to choose the good, freeIy, a11 or most of the time. 
Hence, there is unnecessary evil in the world which cannot be reconciled with 
an all powerful, all knowing, and all good God. 
If compatibilism is rejected as false on the ground that there is no causal 
connection between moral instruction and conduct, it follows that we can no 
longer praise or blame people for the moral guidance (or lack of it) that they 
provide for their children or others. For on this view there would be no efficacy, 
and hence no point, in attempts to help others, through instruction or by 
example, to develop good character from which right choices will follow. And 
if compatibilism is rejected on the ground that causes o r  influences which affect 
behavior remove that behavior from the realm of free (and hence morally 
evaluable) action, equally disastrous results follow. In this case we should 
rightly blame parents, or others, who influence people to do  right, since they 
would thereby have made their action unfree. 
In either case, a consequence of denying compatibilism is that the whole of 
moral life and the use of normative language become meaningless or unintelli- 
gible. After all, it is because early moral training is believed to influence future 
conduct that responsible and thoughtful parents expend so much of their 
energies to provide it. It is because factors in a person's environment are 
believed to influence and shape conduct that so much attention is directed to 
ordering that environment properly. And people are praised or blamed for 
their conduct, in large measure, because the very act of praising and blaming 
is thought to encourage good behavior and deter bad behavior. 
The only way for the theist to escape the consequences entailed by the denial 
of compatibilism is to provide entirely new conceptual frameworks for under- 
standing not onIy moral phenomena but the whole social and legal structure 
of our society as well. But this would be an enormously difficult thing to  do. 
Since what would be calIed for would be entirely new conceptual frameworks 
and ethical concepts, no factual proposition, or collection of factual proposi- 
tions, could entail the desired results. And since the concepts required to save 
the theist's argument would be radically new, they could not be supported by 
our present normative concepts and judgments. 
Further, to construct successfully such totally new conceptual frameworks, 
and to demonstrate that they are consistent with a thoroughgoing indetermin- 
ism, the theist would have to show that human action and choices cannot, even 
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in principle, be explained in causal terms. But this is something he cannot do, 
since it would always be possible to discover in the future that there are causal 
explanations for the conduct in question. The most that the theist could hope 
for would be that moral conduct could not be shown to be explicable in causal 
terms which still preserve the necessary conditions for assessing responsibility 
and applying moral predicates. But if my argument is correct, not only is there 
overwhelming evidence that moral phenomena are explicable in causal terms, 
but that our whole way of thinking and speaking about such phenomena 
presupposes causal explanations. In any case, the disastrous consequences of 
the total rejection of all forms of compatibilism could not be overcome by 
patchwork philosophy or theoIogy; the whole of our present conceptual frame- 
work for understanding moral, social, and legal phenomena would have to be 
replaced. 
Perhaps the problem confronting the theist, and the nature of my argument, 
can be more forcefully stated by considering one of Jesus' parables. A lawyer, 
trying to trick Jesus, asked: "And who is my neighbour?" Jesus, recognizing 
the lawyer's insincerity and desiring to teach his disciples something about the 
moral requirements of Christian love, responded with the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. The point of the story was to impress upon his hearers that one's 
neighbor is anyone in need, and that our obligation is to render help to such 
persons whenever and however we can. After criticizing the behavior of the 
priest and the Levite, Jesus praised the mercy of the Samaritan and admon- 
ished his disciples to "Go, and do thou likewise." 
If the theist denies absolutely that freedom and causality of any sort are 
compatible, he must say that the disciples who took Jesus' story to heart, and 
because of its impact acted accordingly, were deprived by Jesus of the opportu- 
nity to do real moral good. And since Jesus' parable was a cause in their 
befriending those in need, Jesus is blameworthy for having disallowed the 
greater good of their freely choosing to minister to the needy. 
The sort of freedom necessary for the theist's argument to hold is an indeter- 
minism so radical that it destroys everyone's notion of praiseworthy and 
blameworthy actions. But if a freedom less extreme is posited, it would be 
possible for an action to be both free and caused. In that case God is culpable 
for not having created a world in which free agents bring about a greater 
amount of moral good. 
My arguments, if correct, have the following consequences. The existence 
of moral evil is a problem for the theist because God, to be conceived as 
morally perfect, must be conceived as having moral obligations similar to 
men's. It is for this reason that the theist must show that God did not do wrong 
in creating a world with moral evil in it. Thus, the theist must argue either that 
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this is the best of all possible worlds (perfect-world theism), or  that this is the 
best world that it was logically possible for God to create (imperfect-world 
theism). 
Perfect-world theism is logically contradictory and must be rejected. The 
very freedom appealed to by the theist to justify moral evil was shown to entail 
that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Imperfect-world theism is 
contradictory if some form of compatibilism is true, for in that case God could 
have governed causes in such a way as to provide for free choices of the good 
all, or most, of the time. But if compatibilism is rejected, our ordinary moral 
concepts and judgments, including those essential to theism, are rendered 
absurd or  meaningless. In either case, the problem of moral evil is not only 
intractabIe, it is insuperable. 
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